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Early May in 1840 Roumanian —Hungarian appeasement aspirat ions ended 
in the Transylvanian Ore-mountains (Erdélyi Érchegység. Munt Apuseni, 
Erzgebirge) with an episode fitting into a tragic play. The scenario seems 
to be a simple one. loan Dragos, a Roumanian for his nationality, represen­
tative of the Hungarian parliament, arrived to the Transylvanian Ore 
mountains (the last stronghold of Transylvania's Rumanian uprising) 
with the peace conditions of Governor-President Louis Kossuth, to re­
store peace in the area. His mission was about to succeed when Hungarian 
troops led by Imre Hatvani marched into Abrudbánya (Abrud) where the 
peace talks were taking place and thereupon the flames of civil war flared 
up again. Drago§ himself also became one of its victims. Simple as the 
history of these days may seem to be, plenty of its details have still not 
been cleared up. Memoirs and historical research are trying to decide 
which side was responsible for the renewal of hostilities. The contempo- 
rariers accused one another of intentions of mislead and ambush, though 
most of them shifted the responsibility upon Hatvani. Hungarian historio­
graphy generally condemns Hatvani too\ in the Roumanian historiography 
we can read sometimes about Kossuth's "double game".- It seems to be 
justified to complete the ideas formed in the question of responsibility 
with some fresh data, unknown so far or just not taken into consideration. 
Hut first we have to analyse the social and political factors which so consi­
derably determined the complicatcdrelationofthc Roumanian and Hun­
garian national aspirations. The different programs and trends within the 
Roumanian national movement itself should be put into proper light, all 
the more as two lines of the Roumanian national aspirations also turned 
against each other tragically in the spring of 1849.
I
The Roumanian — Hungarian coexistence and national movements 
were determined by geographical and social factors. About half of the 
approximately 6 — 7 million Roumanians lived in the Roumanian principa-
iit ii-s. one-third of them in the territories under the Hungarian Crown, a 
half of the tatter gioup in the Eastern parts of the Kingdom proper and 
the other hatf in Transylvania. More than one-tenth of the some 3 —(t 
million Hungarians lived in Transylvania/' As the sporadic groups of 
transc-arpathian Hungarians had not declared any concrete national prog 
rannne just adhered to their popular culture, so the historic territory of 
Hungary became the scene of the Roumanian —Hungarian coexistence 
where after the national awakening serious problems appeared. The ethnic 
borderline between the two populations was never a single line. We can 
hardly find a region without influential minorities living close together. 
The most important minorities due to their number of social significance 
beside the Roumanians and Hungarians arc the Serbs and Hermans, among 
the latter the Transylvanian Saxons. Another characteristic of this co­
existence is that each of the nationalities occupied a practically determined 
positiott in the social hierarchy, so we can rightly speak of an ethnosocial 
division of labour, developed during the centuries. '
These Roumanians who advanced from the leadership of t heir people 
to the ruling class in the middle ages, were assimilated to the majority of 
nobility in language and religion. When the fjuestion of nationality became 
a political one, they either declared themselves Hungarians or identified 
themselves with Hungarian national aims. Their attitude served as a 
model for the masses of Roumanian sandaled nobility.
Thus they did not join the Roumanian national movement, we 
can rather meet intellectuals emerging from the lesser nobility and 
priesterhood while many personalitiesofthe Roumanian ddr/g/cab"emerged 
from the peasantry. That's why in the consciousness of the masses the 
Hungarian—Roumanian coexistence appeared in the simplified model of 
the Hungarian landlord and Roumanian serf. This pattern was often seen 
and sometimes used for propagandists purposes by rebellious intellectuals 
living in the world of romantic and democratic ideas, and this pattern 
helped them to identify themselves with the destiny oftheir peasant people. 
The spontaneous assimilation of the Roumanian nobility however had more 
considerable effects on the bourgeois national development. When ex­
plaining these phenomena, our historiography generally points out 
that national movements proceed from the claim to secure and promote 
bourgeois development as a starting point even if the demands for social 
and economic changes appeared in the consciousness of the contemporaries 
as subordinated to national claims. As East of the river Elbe there could 
not evolve a bourgeoisie like that of Western Europe, a part of the nobility 
thus played the main role in creating legal conditions for modern national 
development and the bourgeois transformation. This nobility was politi 
callv experienced and interested in the market-oriented production and 
beside that it could make use of the feudal institutions.
In the case of those peoples where the nobility became estranged 
from its original ethnic community, clerical and secular intellectuals took 
the lead in the national movements. In the long run the importance of 
this intelligentsia depended on the process of the bourgeois development of
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Iht- peasantry. on its ability in the market-oriented production and in 
taking advantage of the former nobility's economic decline.
Nobody could foresee in the middle ot the century that in the next 
30 — 40 years banking would give this intelligentsia the field of activity for 
social emergence and as a result this social group would lose its former mar­
ginal role and as a bourgeois stratum would be able to cease to be bureau­
cracy's simple reserve army. In the critical period of the bourgeois 
transformation however the importance of this intelligentsia depended 
on political ups and downs. As a result of this the standpoint of the peas­
antry became important ; under what circumstances it would accept the 
leadership ofthe intelligentsia which had no doubt about being powerless 
without any mass basis, and the less it had to lose the more radical it became 
against its imaginary or real enemies.-'
The regional variety of the tensions determining the existence and 
the ways of emergence for the peasantry and the possible national leading 
forces, the peculiarities in the attitude of these social strata and groups 
foreshadowed the regional varictyof the Roumanian national aspirations 
in Hungary, as early as the 3<)s and 40s of the l!)th century." The revolu­
tion of 1848 nevertheless brought the possibility for the development of 
this variety, which was naturally blended with aspirations deriving from 
claims to integration. As far as it was possible, cohesion and solidarity 
were kept alive between the Roumanian movements in different countries 
and sometimes one of these trends regarded itself as the only true represen­
tative ofthe national interests
II
Within the territory under the Hungarian Crown, the dividing line 
between the trends of Roumanian national movement could be drawn at 
the Kiralyhagd. the historical border of Hungary proper and Transylvania. 
While significant forces ol the Roumanian and Hungarian national aspira­
tions faced each other passionately in the belief of an existential threat 
beyond the Kiralyhagd in Transylvania, on the other side of the Kiralv- 
hagd the different groups —with just a few exceptions —cooperated with 
the bourgeois revolution and with the Hungarian liberals in power. Hut 
there is a striking difference between the aspirations ofthe northern and 
southern regions of Hungary propier as well, [tartly because of the different 
social-economic development, partly because of the religious and political- 
cultural tradit ions. In the Northern region of the country, where the devel­
opment took place perhaps in the most archaic way, in Maramaros. the 
conversion to Greek-Catholic religion had been successful and the relati­
vely strong Roumanian nobility had a great prestige in the social life of 
that country. This nobility, which called itself Roumanian speaking Hun­
garian citizens", backed the Hungarian government's policy up to the 
hilt." In Bihar and in Hansag, in the Southern parts of the country, the 
opposition of Hungarian Lords and Roumanian peasants was more con- 
spicious. Hut on the other hand these regions were effected by agricultural
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prosperity which meant that wide strata of society cou!d make use of 
commodity production and occupy even some of the ioca) tending posit ions. 
And there were such centers of Roumanian culture anti education as the 
University Press of Buda. the Greek-Catholic. Theology at Nagyvárait 
(Oradea) and the Teacher's training college in Arad, with a network of 
regular schools.
Roumanian national consiciousness was getting stronger within the 
..Hungarus" consciousness. We have several examples when the scholars 
of the two peoples had been seeking the connective elements in the past of 
the Roumanian—Hungarian coexistence. So much that Petru Ataior (an 
eminent participant in the movement aiming at equal rightsofthe Rouma 
nian nation with the feudal nations in Transylvania) after getting to Buda 
and working there as a censor of the University Press, published a book 
in 1812, regarded as a bible of national revival in the 183ÜS, in which he 
emphasized that ' the Hungarian nation had never done any injustice to 
the Roumanians".9
The 1830 Buda Calendar gave voice to a rather general and tasting 
conviction in 1830, when it advised "every Roumanian to follow his father 
loan Corvinus de Huniad (János Hunyadi) in matters of the homeland, 
follow his Roman ancestors in matters of national culture''.'"
The Roumanian national education was the basic object, but they 
did not regard the Hungarian national aspirations as a danger threatening 
their existence, which meant for the Roumanian "nationalists" in Tran­
sylvania "that wugguri.su; had its heyday"." Among the Roumanians in 
Hungary, national political aspirations appeared only in the form of con­
spiracy before the revolution. In Lugos (Lugoj) for exa mple, a secret so­
ciety, called "Constitution" w as working around 183)'. the activity of w hich 
was reminiscent of free masonry. Later, in 1848, Prolessor Eftimic Alurgu, 
respected throughout the two Principalities but expelled from Wallachia 
in 1841 as a K. K." subject taking part in a conspiracy, was arrested with 
the charge of conspiracy. In his homeland, in Bánság (Banal) he tried to 
combine his legal practice with national and antifeudal agitation in such a 
manner that while meditating on territorial self government he proposed 
the driving awav of "newcomers" i. e. among others: the Hungarian land­
lords. but this deviation from the idea of bourgeois liberty proved to be 
ephemeral.'"
The development, of national ideology and the Roumanians' starting 
on the way of bourgeois development consequently took national aspira­
tions from the cultural programme to the field of political action. Thc 
Hungarian revolution and the fresh bourgeois constitutionalism guaranteed 
the success of the Roumanian national movement on the political field, but 
at the same time kept it in the derived channel. Alurgu for example was 
released from jail by the Hungarian government. Only about 20 —2f 
Roumanians —six ofthem from Transylvania —were among the more than 
400 members in the House of Representatives of the Parliament in Pest. 
And while the Transylvanian elite could not represent itself in Parlia­
ment, or did not even want to do so, at least nearly all the trends of the
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Roumanians of Hungary proper could be present there, though the national 
movement was so poorly organized that for example a butcher had been 
elected to parliamentary deputy.*-'
As the liberal nobility had started liberating the serfs in the spring of 
1848 and created the system of institutions of the bourgeois constitution­
alism, it became the most important issue for the Roumanians of orthodox 
religion to assure the autonomy of their Church, to separate it, after so 
many futile attempts, from the Serbian orthodox Church. This effort was 
stimulated by the fact that the Serbian national movement claimed a 
territorial autonomy which included larger pieces of land inhabited bv Rou­
manians, too. The radical Roumanian faction wanted to arm the Roumani­
ans of the Bánság with the aid of the Hungarian government, referring to 
the Serbian military threat. With the support of an independent armed 
force, they thought they would be able to take more effective actions for 
the sake of the Roumanian territorial autonomy. Murgu, the leader of the 
radicals, hoped to arrange the support of the Roumanian soldiers in the 
M ilitary Border against the imminent intervention of Tsarist Russia which 
threatened the two Roumanian principalities. Apart l'romthat, he wanted 
to take steps towards concluding an alliance between Hungary and the 
two Roumanian principalities, which was also congruous with the aims of 
a revolution in the principalities.'* The June revolution in Wallachia was 
prepared in the hope of a "Swiss type" confederation based on a Roumanian 
-Hungarian alliance.'" While Murgu and his few followers wanted to 
mobilize the masses by summoning popular meetings, other Roumanian 
intellectuals and the bourgeoisie tried to outline the national political aims 
a t-la rg er or smaller-conferences. They demanded education and 
public administration in the vernacular, and the autonomy of the Church, 
loan Drago§ begun his Roumanian political career in these movements. At 
the same time his role illustrates how the national aspirations, influenced 
by the bourgeois transformation, got over from the cultural field to nation­
wide politics.
HI
loan Dragos was a peculiar character of the times of great changes. As 
a conscious Roumanian patriot, tie supported the national culture bv sub­
scription to Transylvanian Roumanian papers and to publications from 
Wallachia. As a nobleman it was possible for him to become sheriff (szolga­
bíró) in Bihar County.'" file Hungarian liberals however watched him dis­
trustfully with good reason. He, as a "provincial soldier" of Metternich's 
system—a quotation from himself—played an active role in suppressing 
the Hungarian liberal opposition in the county even on the eve of the Re­
volution.'? On the other hand, however, he must have been an excellent 
official well arranging the different troublesome cases of the people. It 
was this quality that he referred to when offering his services to the Hun­
garian government in the summer of 1848. He emphasized that his career 
up to then had already enabled him to diminish the distrust of the people,
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which arose among others because tin- Act emancipating the serfs had been 
pubiished onty in Hungarian, and the county officials did not speak Rou­
manian, anti because the people considered the conscription of parlia- 
mentarv electors as an intention of reintroducing the feudal burdens.'s 
Certainly, his aspirations reflect the Roumanian intellectuals' wish Un­
social and individual rising. But his attitude was also motivated by the 
fact that during the revolution he regarded the opposition and the future 
struggle between the constitutionalism based on popular sovereignity and 
the feudal absolutism as the great question of the age. His liberalism had 
not always been consistent, he gave voice to such ideas against the Serbian 
aspirations in Parliament in Pest as "well, if we fee) so. speak it out 
that Serbians can not live on this land".'" His general attitude was deter­
mined basically by a double loyalty, reminiscent of "hungarus" conscious­
ness which bound him on the one hand to the common homeland, and to 
his ethnical nationality on the other hand. He considered himself "a Hun­
garian patriot" and emphasized—with a reference to Hunvadi as an 
example —that "nationality and patriot ism are tw o different ideas".'-"
This idea meant substantially the assertion of the OMC-.s7n/e-.se:'eruJ- 
Mw/iowa conception against the o?;e-67'//c-oHC-?m/;oa theory, without break­
ing up the unity ofthcstate, and he had always accepted the priority, i. c. 
(to use the contemporary term) the "diplomatic character" of the Hun­
garian language. As a parliamentary deputy he presented a Rill to guaran­
tee the right to use the vernacular for the Roumanians in the county 
administration making clear that "the Roumanian nation is the natural 
ally of the Hungarian nation".s'
And as he had to convince the two in many respects opponent parties, 
he had to outline a different w ay of solution in the case of Hungarians and 
again a different one in the case ofRoumanians. He w anted to convince the 
Hungarians that the Roumanians admitted the Hungarians' merit in not 
defying historical evolution but fighting for the people's rights, but they 
did not conclude on this to the rightfulness of the Hungarian demand that 
they should give up their national identity and aspirations. "These assi­
milating efforts of the zealous Hungarian fellow-citizens arouse the jealou 
usyofthe Roumanians, a painful shame for their despised nation, from 
which logically emerged the longing for lawful emancipation to put an 
end to the shame of a thousand years ofsuffering and mockery." . . For 
the Hungarians to be afraid would not be less than cowardice, as the moral 
superiority of the Hungarian nation is so strong that the Roumanians, just 
disentangling themselves from a longlasting apathy, could not overtake 
the Hungarians for centuries.."  On the other hand, when the Roumanians 
come to share its glory and honour, the Hungarian nation can count on 
the Roumanians as defenders of that glory and honour, w hich already can 
be said about the descendants of the former privileged class.—
When he wanted to convince the Transylvanian Roumanians about 
the possibilities to rise, he argued in his unpublished manifesto as follows: 
"Now the Hungarian goes before me and breaks a track for me and I 
follow him. but the time will come when i  shall go before him and he will
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folloyv me whether he likes it or not".*'' Dragos, and generally those from 
Hungary, however, turned to theleadcrs oft he Transylvanian Roumanians in 
vain to make them cooperate with the Hungarian government in trving 
to reach their national purposes.
IV
The national despair of a considerable part of the Roumanian leaders 
in Transylvania spurred on rebellion, just like the social discontent of the 
peasantry which was a consequence of a more archaic social development. 
The principle of the feudal double possession was not so deep-rooted in 
the landlord—serf relation beyond the Királyhágó that the legal status of 
the rustical and dominical lands would have been sharply separated bv the 
feudal right. The state power could not even standardize the system of 
feudal burdens. The peasantry of Transylvania was generally poorer 
than that of Hungary, on average the peasant holding was less than half 
of that in Hungary proper. The nobility beyond the Királyhágó —though 
it was an integral part of the Hungarian nobility —was weaker and poorer 
compared to its Hungarian counterpart. Its institutions of representation 
(the diet and the counties) were more subordinated to the centra! power. 
So, due to the more archaic social and political conditions the reactionary* 
forces could relatively easily break down the liberal nobility and took over 
the initiative at the diet of 1846/47. They wanted to rule the landlord-serf 
relation and the size of peasant holdings in a way that many of the con­
temporaries were afraid of a mass impoverishment and/or uprising.
It can be explained also by the more archaic conditions why the 
Roumanian-Hungarian relation developed in Transylvania nearly- as a 
reverse of that in Hungary. Most of the Roumanians considered the Hun­
garian national aspirations as an attack against their national existence, 
and the situation got so much worsened in the 40s that the preparation of 
a Bill declaring the equal rights of the orthodox religion had no consider­
able positive reaction amongthe Roumanians though the former layvs, still 
from the 17th century, had only tolerated the Orthodoxy, preventing 
many Roumanian intellectuals from rising. The Roumanian intellectuals 
coupled their dispair yvith a solidarity with the peasantry, and yvhile the 
great generation of the 18th century denied any solidarity with Horea's 
peasant revolt in 1784 the radical youth of the 1840s kept its memory- 
alive as a heroic tradition. The yvish for cooperation yvith the Hungarians 
seemed to overcome the discontent for a short time in the spring of 1848. 
But the forces of bourgeois transformation tragically dispersed. While 
the liberal Hungarian nobility held out the prospect of serf emancipation 
and achieved the convocation of the Diet in Kolozsvár (Cluj, Klausenburg) 
by the end of May, the illusion of the "good Kaiser" —the belief that the 
monarch is yvorking for the yvelfare of the people, but the Hungarian 
noblemen (landlords) keep him back from doing so —became stronger 
and stronger among the serfs. But besides this, as they had seen the right­
eous kings of the fa irly tales in those few Rumanian intellectuals who -  by
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taking U]) the demand of serf emanci])ation —could draw up a mass of 
30 — 40 thousand by midd\lay, at a national assembly convoked wit!i the 
approval of the government authorities in Balazsfalva (Blaj, Blasendorf). 
Having a firm mass base and in the hope of favourable international devel­
opments, the strongest faction of the leading Roumanian intelligentsia 
refused the union of Transylvania and Hungary though the union secured 
fundamentally the emancipation and the creation of a bourgeois constitu 
tionalismin.June.
in  the Summer after the serf emancipation, however, the general Serf- 
landlord opposition disintegrated to smaller local disputes, the militant 
Roumanian intellectuals were either prosecuted for their activity or they 
had to go underground. In the autumn of 1848, when the Habsburg 
counterrevolution took the offensive against the Hungarian revolution, the 
Austrian military leaders of Transylvania felt themselves strong enough to 
take undisguised steps only when they thought they would be able to 
launch a peasant rising in favour of the Monarch. And as the Hungarian 
liberals had set about tosatisfy the Roumanian demands too late and they 
abandoned them very soon, the Roumanian militant intellectuals did not 
feel obliged to refuse the alliance offered by the Austrian military leaders. 
Hoping that Austrian constitutionalism will establish their nationa! auto­
nomy and/or national hegemony, preachers, lawyers, students volunteered 
to call to arms, in the name of the Emperor, 193 000 people. The former 
serfs on the other hand firmly resisted the military conscription ordered by 
the Hungarian government and were certainly eager to take a revenge on 
their landlords. A civil war broke out, which was put an end only when the 
Polish emigrant general Bom, after tough and weary battles, drove out 
the Austrians and the Russian troops which were called in from WaHachia 
to support them. The Roumanian revolters w ithdrew to the Ore-mountains 
which separate Transylvania, from Hungary. That was the scene of the 
peasant revolt in 1784 as well, and now more and more people fled here 
away from the revenge of cert ainlandlords. The Roumanian resistance in 
the Ore-mountains became a Hinterland for Gyulafehervar (Alba Iulia, 
Karlsburg). one of the most up to date fortresses of the age, and so it 
would be more easily defended by the Austrian forces. The settlement of 
the nationality problem of the Roumanians in Transylvania was getting 
more urgent.^'
V
Early April in 1849. those Roumanian representatives of Parliament 
— which had already fled to Debrecen by that time —who stood up for 
the self-defensive struggle of the Hungarians, 14 out of 21 or 22, decided to 
try to mediate between the combattants in order to make peace. They 
feared that a Hungarian breaking down of the Roumanian armed resistance 
would cause damage to them and to the cause of the Roumanians in Hun­
gary as well; it would deprive the "Roumanian nation ofal! her prestige".^ 
th e  Roumanian representatives offered Kossuth to mediate between
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the government and the revolters in the Ore-mountains. Kossuth —em­
phasizing the dangerous character of the mission^" chose loan Dragos to 
get into touch with the revolters. Kossuth "made no commitments . . .  
Dragos acted, therefore, on his own initiative".^ The representative of 
Bihar really intended to inspire confidence in the Hungarian leadership 
in every possible way. Kossuth said about him that he arranged the con­
ditions of the clergy of the Roumanian diocese in Arad with the 'most 
fortunate success", and he was the one who made the proposal that 
Parliament should decide to declare Hungary's independence on April 14 
in the greater church of Debrecen, w here, in public, even those who wanted 
a compromise with Austria were not likely to go into open opposition.-s 
This may have contributed to the fact that Kossuth signed a letter of 
credence for Dragos still on the day of the Declaration of Independence, 
which ordered the local authorities to promote his mission.-"
The Dragos' mission was one of the possible wavs and methods of 
reconciliation. Opposed to bilateral negotiations with conditions of agree­
ment put down like in a treaty, we can call his mission—for lack of a 
better term —a médiat ion. The method of this mediation was appropri­
ately described in a memorial, written by Sigismund Pop. representative of 
Kdvârvidék, in early April, to Laszld Madarasx. one of Kossuth's co­
workers who conducted the home affairs. According to this document, 
the government had had to send to Transylvania such Roumanian indivi­
duals who —in accordance with the plenipotentiary commissioner re­
presenting the leadership of the Hungarian state—could try to negotiate 
with the heads of the Roumanian revolters. These individuals should not 
act as government deputies because it w ould decrease the trustworthiness 
of their mission, but they had hftd to appear as private persons," as sav­
ing angels who take care of the Roumanians' liberty. The success of the 
mission depends on the tactfulness of the individuals."**"
Accordingly Dragos turned to the * leaders oft he Roumanian revolters" 
in a letter on the 19th April. He wrote that the Roumanian representatives 
of the Parliament in Debrecen (they were fourteen including him), all 
agreed to declare to the Hungarian government that "recognizing the 
spirit of this century", they were ready to promote "the liberation of 
peoples from the yoke of absolutism". As Kossuth, "for the sake of this 
cause, commissioned me. to come here and mediate doing my best with 
consideration for the people and to secure peace for our land".***
Dragos could meet the leaders of the uprising as early as 23 April. 
They assured him that ' for the good of Hungary and the possible establish­
ment, of he)' independence" they should lay down their arms if the govern­
ment let them doing it with honour."- In Debrecen Dragos could have 
drawn a picture of his experiments painted in bright colours, because 
Kossuth announced on the 26th of April in Parliament that the Rou­
manians in Transylvania, "realizing their deception, will lay down their 
arms and return to obedience to the law"."" On the same day, upon 
Dragoç' request, the Governor-President wrote down his ideas and condi­
tions.
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in the wake of the re]!eated Hungarian victories over the Austrians, 
the Hungarian government's policy towards tiie nationalities seems to 
have tended to he more open handed and to adjust itself to realities. As 
catty as on the 14th of April. Kossuth made clear his ideas in a letter to 
the authorized government commissioner of Transylvania. László Csány: 
1 sincerely admit that tnv heart is bleeding on still seeing this unfortunate 
people as a mere tool for the Austrian intrigues. And my heart is bleeding 
o)i thinking of the constraints that might he necessary in the future, if thc 
people can not he enlightened and brought hack to legality, it should he 
treated severely by force of arms in order that peace anti order as well as 
Transylvania should at least he completely secured for the nation. \!y 
true wish is then, as far as it can he squared with the nation's dignity, that 
both out of humanity and a consideration towards the Roumanian people as 
well as to spare our strength and he saved front burdens, the case must he 
brought to an end by means rtf peaceful reconcilement. "
The Roumanian standpoint being yet unknown for hint. Kossuth did 
not want to define the conditions before contractingthe Roumanians. On 
April 26, however, itt the letter written upon Dragos' request, he dared 
emphatically that besides vindicating "the diplomatic character " of the 
Hungarian language in the administration and in Parliament, "we do 
wish not only to guarantee the free development of all the nationalities 
and their languages but we also want to promote this development in the 
interest of civilisation*'. And although he did not go into details about the 
question of the use of the vernacular in the county-administration, he 
continued to guarantee the free use of the mother-tongue in communities, 
schools and the church. As to the question of amnesty with which the 
RoumaninnsoftheTransylvanian Ore-mountains were at that time mainly 
concerned. Kossuth emphasized that "as a return for the allegiance towards 
the country I am willing to consign the political offences of the past to 
oblivion in the name of peace and affection. " Although they could not 
meet all the expectations, these conditions served as a basis for the future 
progress. Kossuth wrote about an "honest peace" and he also stressed 
that, unlike the commander of the Austrian forces front the Hungarians in 
January, lie did not demand an unconditional surrender. He was waiting 
for deputies from the mountains though not in order to start, the negotia 
tions but rather he expected them "to pay their homage and to obtain 
guarantees for the favours granted" and he expressed his hope to see 
Roumanian volunteers in the Hungária!! army in the future.^
The optimistic tone of the letter, suggests to forget the fact that the 
Hungarian political leaders looked upon the Roumanian insurgents as 
rebels, and in compliance with the prestige of the revolution and the struggle 
for independence they demanded, above all, a return to loyalty to the 
stateas well assurrender whereas the Roumanian population of the Transyl 
vanian Ore-mountains, also strong in the justice of their cause, demanded 
strict guarantees and. perhaps, also contractual ones in the course of the 
"peaceful reconcilement".
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!n any case, Drago§ set out for the Mountains once ana in in the hope 
of an assured success. On April 28, he reported self-confident ly from Kagv- 
varad (Oradea) to Kossuth that. ' I think that arms are for fighting out 
victory whereas the iahour of the mind is to arrange and secure what the 
arms have won '.'*" And towards this end, he at once made the proposition 
that in case a new government commissioner is sent to Transylvania, he 
shouid be supported by Roumanian representatives, as wei). He atso suggest- 
cd that Murgu shouid be asked to make a proposition for the improvai of 
the Roumanian schooling conditions. On arriving in the Hungarian camp 
at Brad (Brad), however, he realized that his undertaking would face more 
difficuities than he had expected. He was anxious about the mistrust of 
the Roumanians in the (ire-mountains anti tic did not consider the formula­
tion of the Hungarian promise concerning the prospective amnesty ex- 
piicitandconvincing enough. Yet he was mostiv uneasy about the militancy 
of the Hungarian camp. He feared that during his negotiations the Hun­
garian troops wouid continue the operations. And since he feit that he had 
not been given effective heip from the Hungarian government to prevent it, 
he tried to make Kossuth sign an armistice presumably so as if it appears 
he had tried to shift upon him the responsibiiity for the possibie faiiure.
in case I fed victim to my zeal" he wrote to Kossuth on May 2, before 
leaving for the cam]) oft he Roumanian guerillas. *1 bind it on your patrio­
tic honour that you should make these words of ¡nine public so that all 
could see that it is the wrong of others, not mine, that caused my fall. 
If only you had given me power enough that I could achieve a 48-hour 
ceasefire, i would be completely sure and (¡met about the success, but in 
the present situation, a// r/cpc/g/s on concep/ions, wood onr/ yood 
(My italics, A. M.)
We do not know if Dragos had asked for an armistice in Debrecen. We 
could see that Kossuth, from the very beginning, emphasized that the 
action was endangering to life, and it is possible that Dragos propounded 
the possibility of an armistice only at that time. And tragically enough, 
the militant and mistrustful atmosphere was also against armistice. On 
April 26, Kossuth was given a cheer in Parliament, but outside 
Parliament, both the left and the right spoke differently. The journal of 
the so-called Peace-Party (whose social base was the nobility, that was 
loyal to the revolution but disapproved the efforts for independence) 
considered the Roumanian guerillas' willingness to peace as a trick, and 
demanded to call the leaders to account and to neglect punitive sanctions 
against the people, in compliance with the time honoured method in the 
suppression of the peasant revolts.^ As one of the county government 
commissionersintheTransylvanian Ore-mountains put it in a letter written 
weeks before: "Those who are guilty should pay, the innocent should have 
the benefit of the favours of law in constitutional freedom."*'"
There were much more serious consequences of the fact that the radi­
cal youth in Pest, who had hardly any military experiences, driven by a 
vocation of their generation as well as a revolutionary Messianism, be­
gan to organize irregular troops which could be used for guerilla warfare
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und they were preparing for war in terms of the relentlessness of the French 
revolution's actions towards the reactionary forces. Paradoxically, it was 
the journal of the Peace Party again which pubhshed an article by Pál 
Vasvári, an influential radical, in which he demanded the relentless elimi­
nation of the Roumanian resistance and made the Hungarian aristocracy 
too responsible for the civil war in Transylvania. At. the same time, on 
April H), he planned to start a concentrated attack against the Transyl 
vanian Ore-mountains, that he himself began on the 5th of Muvd"
Vasvári's preparations were obviously in connection with the plan 
for the operations, which was worked out by the end of Hat ch in Debrecen. "
In spring the two squadrons of the German legion as well as the irre 
gular troops recruited by the radical lnne Hatvani have been also directed 
to the Hungarian camp at Brad: although Hatvani wanted to gain distinc­
tion by fighting against the Serbian uprising and he wanted to act "as 
a republican should, and to fellow what the French revolutionists did 
against the revolting towns and what they confessed their principles".'-
The Ministry of War however does not seem to have urged the con­
centrated attack. On April 17, the Ministry definitely commissioned the 
cliief commander of the forces at Brád, Kálmán Csutak, "to restrict to 
defence and to initiate attacks only in case they are adequate to your 
potential, whereby success will be guaranteed".'''* General Bern, however, 
did not bother about what the Ministry had ordered in this case, cither. 
While marching against the Austrian forces in Southern-Hungary, he 
gave order to relieve from his position anti to arrest Csutak, because of his 
inefficiency." however, it seems that this soldier now out of favour had 
learnt how difficult it is to achieve a lasting success with that small force 
he had, anti in order to support Dragos' undertaking, he promised an 8-dav 
long ceasefire w hich was known by the Roumanians to be valid for an unde 
fined length of time."The Polish general's favourite soldier, count János 
Bánffy, brought the warrant of arrest. Bánffy was claimed, but there an­
no positive data that he would have encouraged the newly appointed, am­
bitious chief commander, Imre Hatvani, to be more militant.'" On April 
26. Hatvani, as a partisan of "peaceful reconcilement", demanded that 
the Roumanians^ enter into personal negotiations, but only one of the 
Wallachian emigrants, w hom the Roumanian guerillas trusted, stayed for 
a longer period in the Hungarian camp as Dragos' guide. The tension of 
the atmosphere was increased by the news which said that the Hungarian 
population of Abrudbánya, a small tow n occupied by the Roumanians, is 
in danger of death. Tims Dragos was right in realizing that ,/d/ depead-s- oa 
roacep/tOHs, /aood and yood /Me/ ". '"
it was his extraordinary courage and determination that made him 
leave for Abrudbánya, on Hay 3, w here the talks were to be held, before 
Kossuth's answer would have arrived. After his arrival he asked Hatvani 
in a letter not to try to march on Abrudbánya, because "even if you do not 
mind sacrificing my life" —the Hungarian troops can also lie destroyed 
and there is no reason for intervention because the Hungarian population 
of Abrudbánya was not assaulted either.'"
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At last, on 3 May, the actual talks could begin. On April 23, the only 
intention of Avram lancu, the 'K ing oft he Mountains", the best known lead­
er of the Roumanianresistancc, wastogainextra-timewhenhegot in touch 
with Dragos. In the belief that considerably big Austrian forces are station 
ed in the neighbourhood, he asked for military aid on 24 April since he 
thought that the resistance could not last over two weeks.5" When he was 
informed of the repeated defeat of the Austrians two days later as well 
as when he realized the neutrality of the Hungarian military leaders, he 
let it be known to the commander of the fort at Gyulafehérvár that "in 
the present hopeless situation we either resort to a final effort to resist or 
surrender as we have been called on to."si
The Roumanian leaders of the Transylvanian (ire-mountains could not 
come to a common stand. Some of them wanted peace, some of them were 
willing to fight to the very end even if they feared that their own people, 
exhausted in warring, might deliver them into the hands of the enemy, 
just like the leaders of the peasant-revolt in 1784.$" The most prominent 
Roumanian leaders considered their own struggle as a part of the European 
national struggles for liberty and therefore they put trust in the European 
public opinion. By then, however, they had to realize that, from an ob­
jective point of view, they had supported the counterrevolution, and the 
monarch had proved to be ungrateful and their ally was an "untrust worthy 
friend". Moreover, loan Huteanu, who was examining the European power 
relations perhaps the most carefully, went so far as to say that "the aim 
of the present Austrian policy" .. . "is to slaughter each other and, so 
weakened, we shall be exposed to our enemies' will" A' And in the meantime 
the half-dozen emigrants of the suppressed revolution in Wallachia were 
also bent on persuading the Transylvanian Roumanian leaders to coope­
rate with the Hungarian government.^' This cooperation demanded self­
consistence. So as it was formulated by Avram lancu in his letter to the 
commander of Gyulafehérvár: "Even if it comes to surrender, the Rouma­
nians would remain watchful. I t would not be either at the expense of 
theirs or that of the country because they are ready to die rather than 
break their oath on the Field of Liberty" A On May 13 in 1348 in the Field 
of Liberty in Balázsfalva the people were made to take an oath on their 
loyalty to the Austrian house, to the emperor and on the safeguard of the 
Roumanian nation's interests as well as on showing respect for "all the 
nations in Transylvania"A' Now the question is, whether Kossuth's letter 
from April 26 and the Hungarian policy could be given an interpretation 
so that the past should not have to be totally denied. Our data give a 
positive answer.
In the report, dated from the end of 1849, which should have been 
compiled by lancu, but which in fact was made by the open-minded loan 
Maiorescu in close cooperation with lancu on the ground of the "prota­
gonists'" data, Kossuth's letter was estimated positively. Since "in 
that letter Kossuth guaranteed for the Roumanians' equality before the 
law as well as the free use of their language not only in the church and 
schools but also in the communities, and he made it possible for them to
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put forward their request in Roumanian to the government; he provided 
state support fra* the schools and other educational institutions, ho pro­
mised ehurch-autnnomy andjaryforthe Roumanian as wcli as at) the other 
refinions' priests."*^ And they did not doubt the seriousness of the pro­
mise of amnesty for Roumanians. Of course, we must not forget that this 
report dates, as we have already mentioned, from the end of 1849. Hut 
some documents of the Roumanians' conditions for the negotiations of 
May 1849, which were compiled to be discussed in public have been preserv 
cd. They recognized the union of Transylvania with Hungary and added 
that they stick to being recognized as a fourth nation in Transylvania 
onlv in case the former svstem of the nations would be maintained there, 
and their demands concerning the use of language went beyond the fratnc 
drawn by Kossuth only in a lew respects, namely, they demanded the use 
of the Roumanian language in the count ies. but as we have seen, this ques­
tion was left open bv Kossuth as well.
It seems that in the given situation it was not the national problem 
but rather the general political orientation which made the opinions v ar\. 
The first item of the Roumanians' conditions stressed the loyalty towards 
the imperial house and the emperor who is referred to as Emperor Ferdi­
nand, though, he was made to resign a year before.*" The leaders of the 
Roumanian insurrection, however, had to continue to take into account the 
people's loyalty towards the emperor, which was so often emphasized. 
And since the maintenance of the resistance was basically dependent upon 
the mood of the people, public meetings were convened in and in the neigh 
bourhood of Abrudbanya to see clearly, how Dragos' arguments and pro­
mises were reacted to. There are some who claim that Dragos actually 
failed just because of his critical remarks on the imperial house.*" Accord­
ing to others some of the communities soon came to the decision of surrend­
er as Dragos promised not only food to the starving people but he also 
succeeded in dispelling some beliefs having extraordinarily mobilizing 
effects among people. According to the "authentic""" account of one of 
the eyewitnesses, who took part on the meeting at Topanfalva (Cimpeni. 
Topesdorf) on the 5 of May. "the Roumanians had thought so until now 
that the Hungarians wanted to deprive them of the divine grace of liberty 
as well as their nationality, religion and language, but now, realizing just 
the opposite of all these, they are ready to shake hands with the Hungari­
ans on condition that they will not send armed forcesagainstthe Roumani 
ans, who. on the other hand, can send a delegation to the Hungarian govern­
ment in order to pay homage and put forward their requests."'"
lancu, however, did not take sides. And we will probably never get to 
know what he would have decided. In the afternoon on .\!av G, the approach 
of the Hungarian troops put an end to the negotiations that had been going 
on for three days. It was all in vainthat Dragos andthe Roumanian chief 
magistrate of Abrudbanya went before them, trying to prevent their 
marching into the town, saying that the peace was accomplished and 
the Roumanians were ready to lav down their arms. Hatvani could not be 
dissuaded. One would say he was influenced by a mysterious letter*-.
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another would say the he and his troop were thrown into fever by the news 
about the id-treatment of the Hungarian population of Abrudbanva and 
later he tried to justify himself by the same reasons.U nfortunatelv, 
Hatvani's very report in which, for the first time, on 6 May, tie presented 
"the reasons that made me come to the decision that I shouid attack 
Abrudbanva, at any rate, before the end of Dragos' negotiations" is miss­
ing."*
The hasty, adventurous marching in spoiiedeverything. The negotia­
tions continued for a white, though Iancu escaped and the tesser and greater 
atrocities became the inevitabte consequences of the situation. In vain did 
Dragos try to persuade Iancu to continue the negotiations, suggesting 
that he would not be abte to resist Hatvani's forces."'* The Roumanians of 
the Transylvanian Ore-mountains, realizing their numerical superiority, 
after a series of advance-guard actions, started an offensive on 9 May. 
After two days' fights. Hatvani. in lack of ammunition, was to make a 
headlong flight."" Until the outrageous revenge was not calmed down, 
onty those Hungarian citizens could feet safe in town who were hidden by 
their daring Roumanian acquaintances. As for Dragos, he was put to the 
sword by the soldiers of a confident of the Austrian military expert."? On 
the other hand, Hatvani ordered the execution of those Roumanian leaders 
-  Pet-ru Dobra and, a week later. loan Huteanu -  who would have liked 
to go to Debrecen to continue the peace talks.
Parallel with the events in Abrudbanva, the atmosphere of distrust 
became more and more prevailing in Debrecen, too. A Roumanian letter, 
dated from the beginning of April and including a threat for the burning 
down of the Hungarian town Torda caused serious concern.""
At the same time, the Transylvanian government commissioner Csanyi 
sent back Kossuth's letter of 2G April, and warned Kossuth that the Rouma­
nians had been informed of the delay of a possible Moldavian invasion by 
the Emperor and the Tzar but they were called upon to be on the alert in 
the future, too. Therefore, "the Roumanian leaders cannot be left here even 
if they are obedient. At least they should be transported to Hungary"."" 
His reason for this suggestion was that, when in the autumn of 1848, some 
priests and minor officials were released after being arrested for taking 
part in lesser actions in the Transylvanian western mountains during the 
summer of 1848, they immediately joined in the preparations for the Rou 
manian uprising. In this atmosphere Kossuth's standpoint also turned 
more uncomplying. He obviously looked upon the Roumanian attitude a 
policy of trying to gain time. Therefore, at the time when he could not yet 
be informed of the bloody events at Abrudbanva, on If) May, he asked the 
Ministry of War to appoint somebody to the post of the chief commander 
in the western mountains and to continue the war, "because if the revolters 
can install themselves in the forests before they have turned green, it will 
cause a lot of troubles to get rid of them".?" And he let Dragos know* of 
this issue still on the same day, rejecting firmly the ceasefire and to go into 
details concerning his promise of the amnesty. And. after finding it credible 
what Hatvani wrote in his formerly mentioned, lost report, he also gave
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Hatvani order, "to continue his work forcefully, ])ay itgr no attention to 
any by-interest", but he also added that he won id subordinate him and 
his irregular troops to ihe new professional commander, who is soon to be 
appointed by the Ministry of War.'^ The reason why Kossuth's standpoint 
brought about espeeiaiiy harmful consequences was that Hatvani, being 
unabie to form a realistic judgement on the situation and, in the possession 
of this order to continue the war, could feel entitled to try to put things 
l ight before giving up his post of commander-in-chief. In the belief that, if 
Dragos had not dissuaded him from starting an immediate attack in the 
I its) days, he could have destroyed the Roumanian resistance, Hatvani, 
neglecting the fact that the Roumanians' numerical superiority had been 
mulitplied, a week after the catastrophe, occupied Abrudbánya again and 
he was defeated still more ignominously this time. Kossuth's order was 
also caught by the Roumanians, which was one more argument for them to 
justify the wait-and-see policy.
These issues, containing a lot more details still unknown to us, {'rövid­
ed opportunity for Kossuth's attitude to be considered as a "double-game". 
Characteristically, the same historian whofirst used this phrase in his post­
humous work published in the 1 !i(i()s"-. in 1947 relying on the same sources 
and data voiced the necessity of a '"brotherly" solution of the Roumanian — 
Hungarian disagreements. In 1947 concluding from the fact that Kossuth 
did not promise a ceasefire, he emphasized Dragos' responsibility and 
suggested that the final judgement in the question of responsibility could 
not be passed without knowing the content of Hatvani's lost report from 
t he <i May 1849.^
The above-mentioned facts seem to make it clear enough that neither 
of the opposing sides can be made unambigously responsible, it is the 
ambiguity of the whole situation rather than that of the individual attitudes 
that should be emphasized.
Characteristically, the same General György Klapka, who wanted 
to court-martial Hatvani in 1849.^ when emphasizing the necessity of 
avoiding ambivalent situations, in his letter to Kossuth in 1802, recal­
led Hatvani's "treachery": "Rut for his activity, the Roumanians and 
Hungarians would have come to an agreement since long. But this bloody 
monument of a contemptible perfidy as a phantom has ever since been 
standing in between the two parties to set them a p a r t . A n d  we might 
as well quote similar opinions from a number of Hungarian contemporaries, 
but we have to emphasize the fact that "phantoms" of this sort were 
brought to life not only by the feeling of pain caused by the sacrifice of hu­
man lives but they are also distorted expressions of real contradictions, 
w hich can also be made use of for manipulative purposes.
VI
Never did the "peaceful reconcilement" seem to be so near and at 
the same time so distant as it was in the .May of 1849.
"It is my sad experience " — government commissioner Csány wrote 
— that the peaceful reconcilement remains only a desired but unrealiz-
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able hope of ours, thereby the rebe!s can be calmed down only by weapons 
and force."'" In vain was the military expedition launched in the Transyl­
vanian Ore-mountains a month later, conducted by an experienced soldier. 
Farkas Kemeny this time, although without heavy losses, it also ended in 
a failure.
At the end of June, Iancu could well react to a Hungarian attempt at 
reconciliation by saying that, "in Transylvania and Hungary, in these 
brotherly countries, neither the Hungarians can ignore the Roumanians, 
nor the Roumanians the Hungarians when it comes to existence and future 
and weapons can never be judges between us."'''
The teaching of the issues at Abrudbanya suggested a warning and 
were also encouraging. Encouraging in the sense that there is a chance for 
hope in the reconciliation of the common problems and that there will 
always be people to run the risk of initiations. And warning in the sense 
that the rules of the game should be defined far more carefully. This is 
why Dragos' lot did not frighten back those Roumanian representatives 
who started a mediatory action for peace. At the beginning of June, they 
proposed a similar but more carefully prepared action to the Hungarian 
government which, also under the influence of the Russian intervention, 
at that time set it as a definite aim to "reconcile" the armed Serbian and 
Roumanian resistance fighters.?s
It was not, however, mediation between the parties in opposition but 
negotiation and to define the conditions in a written agreement, that proved 
to be the realistic way of solving these problems. As a result of the initia 
tive activity and unyielding persistance of the leading figure of the Walla- 
chian revolutionary emigration, Nicolac Balcescu, around the middle of 
July, the Rumanian emigrants and the Hungarian government concluded 
an agreement, the "projet de pacification", which declared the principles 
of the relationship between the two nations in a mutually acceptable way, 
and what is more, according to this agreement Iancu was to take part in 
the common struggle as the head of a legion vowed loyalty to " Roumania 
and Hungary".?" At the end of July Parliament passed a resolution 
regulating those rights of the use of mothertongue, which made "the free 
national evolvement" possible for the nationalities in H u n g a ry .F irs t it 
was Balcescu, then E. Murgu. who gave up his so far passive attitude, left 
for the Transylvanian western mountains in order to convince the leaders 
of the Roumanian insurrection ofthe necessity to hold together, by showing 
them the documents that promised of decisive significance. But there was 
no time left to realize this. The attempt at reconciliation still had become 
more than an exemplary trial to settle the question of nationalities. It 
was the result of these events that Iancu showed a benevolent neutrality 
instead of being revengeful, when the superior force of the reaction had 
consumed the energy of the Hungarian war of independence. Overmore, 
after the main body of the Hungarian army had surrendered to the troops 
of the Tzar. Iancu the "King of the Mountains" made a gesture by releas­
ing a few hundred Hungarian captured soldiers, to the greatest annoyance 
of the Austrian military expert, while fights still went on to indicate the
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f'ontinuntion of the civil war.^  ^ Tins victory of the Habsburg counterrevo­
lution and the common oppression justified the efforts for a reconciliation, 
of which the mission of Dratros. was a chapter, rich in illuminating details.
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ta te a  na^ionala. 1334— !349 (T he struggle  for u n ity  na tio n a l o ft ho R oum anians. 1334 — 
!349). (B ucuresti, 1997).; On th e  d ifferen t regions see (.'Лсгсл/срА/. t ..* A balázstálv i neni- 
zoti gyűlés, !343 m ájus 15 — t 7 (The n a tio n a l m ee tin g  a t  B alázsfalva  15— 17 M ay 1343).
7S A. MISKOI.CZY
(B u k arest. 1997).; / .  77.. R evo lu (ia  de la 1848 — 1849 in B anat (T he  R ev o lu tio n  in
th e  B anat 1848— 1849). (B u curesti, !9tiS).; /7:7с/мп.?, K. T h eR o u n m n ia ft N a tional Alove- 
m ent in  T ran sy lv an ia . 1789—1849. (C am bridge. Mass. 1999).
" /^oydc/n-Dt/i'cd, (7./ E ftim ie  M urgti (B ueu iesti, 1937), p. 13s.; Udrud?/. (7.; A láram aros- 
m e g w  1848-han (A láraínaros C o u n ty  in 1848). H azán k  1885, pp. 173 —ISO.; A d ec lara tion  
o f  R o u m an ian  noblem en Írom  M áram aros was published  in Resti H írlap  no. 50. Ju n e  9, 
IS4S.
" P n p m  —7/ыг/ып?/, A .;  Isto ria  Ronauuku* d in  D acia Superiore (H is to ry  o f  th e  R o m n an ian s 
in D acia Superior). (V iena, 1852), \*ol. 11. p. CV. considers th is  opin ion as a  refusal o f  th e  
1790T ransy lvan ian  R o u m an ian -national-asp ira tions. R ecen tly  on  th e  U n iv ersity  P ress in 
B uda see .l/rsM czy , A..* Ax E gyetem i N yom da szerepe a  rom án m űvelődésben (The role 
o f  th e  U n iv e rs ity  P ress in  th e  R u m an ian  c u ltu ra llife ) , Uj A urora  No. 2, pp. 93 — 100.
Е м . .Vartco, (Л —//^0.-?, / .  —A/urc, С. — 7/м^м, C..* Ideológia g enerá lié i ro m án é  d e  la 1848 
d in  T ran silv an ia  (Ideology o f th e  R o u m an ian  g en era tio n  Isiforc !S 4 S in T ra ttsy lv an ia ) . 
(B ucure$ti, 1998), jj. 197. considers th is  view  very  ch arac te ris tic  o f  th e  age.
"  P u p ű i ;  Is to ria  (see n o te  9.) Vol. II . p. C X V III . I  he p a r tic ip a n ts  itt th e  n a tio n a l m ovem ent 
called them selves na tio n a lis ts .
Аги/я, 7/.. A tiemxetist!'gi kérdés (see n o te  5.) Yol. 11. p. 193, 291.
A..* A m ag y ar v á lasz tási rendszer 1H48—1849-bcn. (T he  H u ngarian  e lecto ra l 
system  itt 1S4S — 1849) (B u d ap est, 1993), pp  291 —319.
"  DmpoM;??*.* S tud ii §i d o cum en te  (see n o te  7.) 327 — 389.; / .  Tó/á, Z . A m ag y ar —rom án  
szövetség  kérdése 1848 —1849-ben (The question  o f th e  H un g arian  — R o u m an ian  alliance). 
In : M agyarok és rom ánok  (see n o te  1.) pp . 195 — 244.
'3 On th e  an teced en ts  o f  th e  "co n fcd e rn tio n a l"  ideas, see М^уА'я/ез /^, A .;  A ro m án  nem zeti 
egység kérdése  és az 1849-es havasalfö ld i fo rradalm i m ozgalom  (T he R o u m an ian  n a tio n a l 
u n ity  an d  th e  W allach ian  rev o lu tio n ary  m ovem ent in 1849). Századok 1973. pp . 499 — 429. 
'с 7..' — lo an  Dragos. T ran silv an ia  1898. p p . 25 — 39.
K özlöny 1848, 28 A ugust, No. 89.
*s ZZcdA*, /..- 1848. A szabadságharc  tö rté n e te  levelekben, aho g y an  a  kot tá rs a k  lá t tá k  (1848. 
T h e  h is to ry  o f th e  struggle  fot l ib e r ty  in le tte rs  as th e  con tem poraries saw  it). (B udapest), 
pp. 131 —133.
K özlöny 1848, 2 A ugust, No. 54.
"" K özlöny 1848, 11 A ugust, No. 93.
/?tér, <7. — A..* Az 1818/49. évi népképvisele ti o rszággyűlés (The rep resen ta tiv e
p arliam en t in 1848— 1849). (B u d ap est, 1954), pp. 8 9 2 —893.
-- 77гпуя$, .7..* A rom ánok  (The R oum anians). K ossuth  Hit lap ja  !ч4м, 17 S ep tem ber, No. 9к. 
Dragop (see n o te  19.) pp . 44 — 49.
2* Ott th e  pecu liarities o f th e  T ran sy lv an ian  developm ent und th e ir  po litica l e ffects, see 
Y'rdcsdm/t*, Z^. / Az erdély i p a rasz tság  tö r té n e te , 1790 1849 (T he h is to ry  o f  th e  p easan try
in T ran sy lv an ia , 1790 — 1849). (B udapest, 1959).; /dew , W esselényi Miklós. (B u d ap est. 
1965).; С'Л*?у*елк'у?м, A bnlázstálvi nem zeti gyű lés (see n o te  7 .); A/t'^Aro/czy, A .;  T ársadalm i 
é s  nem zeti kérdés az u tolsó erdély i rendi országgyűlésen (Social and  n a tio n a l p rob lem s a t 
tlte  hist d ie t in T ran sy lvan ia). Századok 1979, No. 5, pp . 851 —853.; /<7с?и, Ax erdély i 
m ag y ar liberális ellenzék társad a lm i reform törekvései (A ttem p ts  a t social reform  o f  th e  
H u ngarian  libera! opposition  in  T u m sy lvan ia) Jo g tu d o m án y i K özlöny 1980, No. 19. 
pp. 954 — 992.; 7dcw, Népesség, társad a lo m  és gazdaság  E rd é ly b en  a feudalizm us v á lsá ­
g án ak  idején  (P opu la tion , society  an d  econom y in T ran sy lv an ia  d u rin g  th e  crisis o f 
feudalism ). T örténelm i Szemle 1989. No. 3, pp . 5 9 9 —529.
23 Q u o ta tio n  from  th e  m em oirs o f  th e  R oum an ian  rep resen ta tiv e  C o n stan tin  P ap la lv i, see 
/ .  7W i, Z . . K ossu th , D ragopés Papfa lv i. In : M agyarok és rom ánok  (see n o te  1.) p. 328.
26 Ib id . 329.
27 /7йсЛ/нл, op. c it. (see n o te  7.) p. 299.
28 Z/uriu, / .. ' (ed.) K ossu th  L ajos 1848/49-ben (Lajos K o ssu th  in  1848—49) K o ssu th  L ajos 
összes m u n k ái (Collected w orks of Lajos K ossu th). Vol. X IV . p. 889. H e re a f te r  c ited  as 
KZ^ŐJÍ
2" Ib id . p. 899.
Q uo ted  by / .  Z. A Szem ére k o rm án y  nem zetiségi p o litik á ja  (The n a tio n a lity  policy
o f th e  Szcm ere gov ern m en t). Нм 7dew, M agyarok és rom ánok  (see n o te  7.) pp . 352 — 353. 
*" Z^uyowM-, S tud ii (see n o te  7.) (Sibiu, 1944), Yol. 11. p. 195.
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D rago^ to  th e  governm en t com m issioner o f  X aránd C ounty , 25 A pri!. 1849, sec / / ''yy,',,/. 
Л /.; B iharvártnegvo  )848 —49-ben (B ih ar C oun ty  in 1848 — 1849). N ag y v árad . 1885. p. 
333.
S3 A'AŐ.H, Voi. XV. p . 134.
s ' A'AŐ.H, Vol. X IV . p . 890.
ss KAŐ.W. Vo). XV. pp . 1 3 9 -1 3 9 .
sc OL (H u n g arian  N a tio n a l A rchives). O rszágos H onvédelm i B izo ttm án y  (N ational Defense 
C om m ittee), h e rea fte r  c ited  a s  0 / / / / .  1849 : 6300.
37 P a r ts  o f  th is  le t te r  w ere f irs t q u o ted  irt D rayow tr, .S'.. T ra ta tiv e le  rom áne-m aghiare  din 
v a ra  an u h ti 1849 (R oum an ian  —H u n g arian  n eg o tia tions in th e  Sum m er o f  1849). (Cluj 
K olozsvár. 1947), p. 12.
33 E s ti  L apok  1849, 30 A pril, No. 57.
3" OL, H ad ü g ym in isz térium  (m inist ry  o f  W ar). h e rea fte r  c ited  a s  Mm. ) 849: 9864.
E s ti  L apok  1849, 23 A pril, N o. 51.
"  T h e  Minist ry  o f  W ar hnndcd th e  p lan  over to  t he N a tional Defence C om m ittee ut th e  end 
o f  M arch (O H B , 1849 : 3891) an d  th o u g h  it was re tu rn e d , it )tas tto t y e t boon found. T he 
n ew spaper E s ti L apok  1849, 23 A pril, No. 51, p ub lished  a w ar b u lle tin  referring  to  a 
co n cen tra ted  a tta c k , d a te d  from  1ft A p ril. by  V asvári. On th e  h u m an ita rian  a tt i tu d e  o f 
V asvári d u rin g  th e  o p erations, sec th e  n o tes  o f  Is tv á n  Popovics front th e  end o f  th e  cen­
tu ry . H a d tö r té n e ti  L ev é ltá r (M ilita ry  Archives), h e re a f te r  c ited  as H L , 1848 — 49. évi 
ira to k  (D ocum ents o f  1848 — 1849)
'3 OL, 11m, (see n o te  39.). 1849 : 5994.
33 OL, H tn , 1849 : 13379.
"  Ib id
'r  K özlöny  1S49, 27 A pril, No. 99.
Cstdnür, K . . A radi fogságon, a la t t  írt a d a to k  az  1848/9 óv iszabadságharc  különösen az 
E rd é ly  havasai ellen v eze te tt h a d já ra tró l (N otes from  th e  prison o f A tari on  th e  strugg le  for 
l ib e r ty  m ain ly  on  th e  w ar against th e  T ran sy lv an ian  M ountains in 1848 — 1849). (Pest, 
1868), pp. 75 —76, is a  source o f  apologét ica! ch arac te r.
'* Drayonu'r, S tu d ii (see trotes 7. a n d  31.) Vol. 11. pp . 196 — 197.
'3 See n o te  37.
'3 O L, H m  (see n o te  39.) 1849: 13379
3" Druyontfr, S tud ii (see n o tes  7. and 31.) Vol. 11. p. 254.
3' Aáúé. 1848 (see n o te  18.) p . 362.
33 Sim ion B ah n t, a  R o u m an ian  leader according to  one o f  his le tte rs  w as aft a id  o f  ex tra d itio n  
how ever w an ted  to  co n tinue  th e  a rm ed  strugg le  to  th e  e n d  (B ib lio teca  Academ iei R epub- 
licii Socialista R om án ia , B ucure^ ti, Ms. 1961, p. 48), lo a n  B u tea n u , th o u g h  h e  w as also 
a fra id  o f e x tra d itio n  stood  up  for th e  peaceful reconciliation  w ith  H un g arian  G overnm ent, 
D ragom ir (see n o tes 7. an d  31.) Vol 11. pp . 71 —74.
33 Up. c it. p. 63.
3' Op. c it. Vol. 1. p. 177.
33 ÍA'úé, 1848 (see n o te  18 ) p. 362.
36 C/tercs/rytu, A halázsfalvi n em zeti gyű lés (see n o te  7.) p. 469.
37 Ronca, А —АА'/м, t ..* A vraru  lau cu , docum ente  si b ib liografie  (D ocum ents and b ib lio ­
g rap h y ). (B ucurc$ti, 1974), p. 181.
33 Dra¡/onn'r, S tud ii (see n o tes  7. an d  31.) Vol. 11. p. 199.
3'3 A'unca—№*/M, A vram  la n c u  (see tro te  57.) p. 168.
"6 Druyomt'r. A vrant la n c u  (see n o te  2.) p . 168.
(s'Arctt — ,j?мАф'о, Dragog (sec n o te  lti.) pp . 39 — 31.
"3 W ith o u t g iv ing  th e  source, see Jen ő  G yalokay , A / erdély i h a d já ra t 1849 n y arán  (T ran ­
sy lv an ian  W ar in  th e  Spring  1849), (B u d ap est), p. 29.
''3<S'2tMyy;*, A'.; A lsófehér várm eg y e  1848—49-ben (A lsófehér C oun ty  in 184.8 — 49), (Nagy- 
enyed , 1896).; ,j,'Arca — -¡Adu/i'u, V..* D in isto ria  m u ñ id o r  apuseni ( f ro m  th e  h is to ry  o f th e  
W cste rn  M ountains). O azeta  T ransilvan ic i 1892, No. 97. 1 h e  r a te 's  q u o ted  re p o rt  was 
also published  in th e  co n tem p o ra ry  press (K özlöny 1849, 18 M ay. No. 198). N o th in g  was 
pub lished , how ever, about th e  reasons lo r H at v an i's  m arch ing-in , in th e  no tes o f  Sim on 
Csorlta, a  citizen  o f  A b ru d b án y a . pu t dow tt soon a f te r  th e  trag ic  even ts, see O rszágos 
Széchényi K ö n y v tá r  K é z ira ttá ra , (N ational Széchényi L ib ra ry , M anuscrip t Collection), 
Q uart. H ung . 2585. A ccording to  th e  n o tes o f a n  unknow n conserva tive-m inded  m an
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Iancu w ould have prom ised th e  h lo o d v  revenge in th e  case o f  H a tv a n i 's  m arch in g  in, 
see OL, D essew ffy Emil ira ta i (P ap ers  o f  E m il Dessew ffy), Fasc. 2. 5. b.
Brayomá-, T ra ta tiv e le  (see n o te  37) p. 12. Cf. CzeH, d..- B ern 's Feldzug  in S iebenbürgen  in 
den  J a h re n  1848 u n d  1849. (H am b u rg , 1859), pp. 395 — 398.
<)?(e!*ca — Dr ago§,  (see n o te  16), p . 51.
"s T he rep o rts  o f  V ik to r A*/cm, ch ie f lie u ten a n t in th e  3. com pagnie o f  th e  C erm an  Legion 
(see n o te  4 i) ,  1 8 4 8 -  1849: 27/251. 27/271. 27/272, 27/452.
Bruyoau'r, S tu d ii, (see n o te s  7. and 31) Vol. 1. 178.; Id em . A vram  Ian cu . (see n o te  ) n 
185. '  '  '
"" E sti L ap o k  1849, 5 Alay, Xo. 92.; Alárczius T izenö töd ike  1849, 12 Alay. Xo. 29.
^  OL. 0 / / /? ,  1849; 8576, f irs t ([noted  b v  Oruyout/r. Ian cu  (see n o te  2.) p. 195 
"" K L Ő J /, Vol. X V . p . 262.
7* /Ate/. p p . 273 —274.
7* B rayom tr, A vram  Ia n cu  (see n o te  2.) p . 186.
73 D ra y w u r, T ra ta tiv e le  (see n o te  37.) pp . 12 — 13.
7 '  G eneral G yörgy K lap k a  dem an d ed  th e  investiga tion  o f th e  A rm y  C ourt in th e  a ffa ir 
H a tv an i on 24 M ay (0/7/?, 1849 : 7389). on 2 Ju n e  K áro ly  S zen tivnnyi, th e  successor o f 
CsAnyi, to o  (0 / //? . 1849: 7873). T h e  in v estiga tions w ere u rged  bv  K ossu th  h im self see 
A* L Ő J/, Vol. X V . p.619.
73 OL, György A lu p /u  ira ta i (T he p ap ers  o f  G yörgy K lap k a) Ease. 11 . 1  have  to  th a n k  Air. 
B éta K á lm án  fo r th is  in fo rm ation . A ty p ica l c o n tem p o ra ry  m an ifes ta tio n  can  be found  in 
a  le t te r  to  K o ssu th  b y  a  lieu ten an t o f  H a tv a n i 's  guerilla  tro o p ; "b a d  luck  d e v a s ta te d  to  
such  a  g re a t e x te n t p e rh ap s in o rder to  p u n ish  us b y  th e  revengeful God for th e  sins o f  
th e  C om m ander". See OL, H m  (see n o te  39) 1849: 18875.
7" C.sdny'.s le t te r  to  colonel F a rk as K em ény, see Aíagyar T u d om ányos A kadém ia K ö n y v ­
tá rá n a k  K é z ira ttá ra  (A lanuscript Collection o f  th e  L ib ra ry  o f  th e  H u n g a rian  A cadem v 
o f  Sciences, C sány László lev é ltá ra , m áso la tok , (P ap ers  o f  L ászló C sánv, D nnlieates) 
X X X I . 23. * '  "
"  T rnnsiivan ia  1877, pp. 54 — 56.; Ion  Lu/ta^, A vram  lán cú . A n u aru l in s titu tu lu i tie isto ri 
1924 — 1925. Cluj, Vol. I I I .  pp . 53 — 54.
73 Bed/-, 1848 (see n o te  18.) pp . 373 —374.
7« ÁTLŐJ/, Vol. X V . p . 436.
33 Beér —C<M3Min</t<!, 1848/49 (see n o te  21.) p. 868.
K riegsarch iv , W ien, K riegsm in iste rium , P rá s id ia lak ten  (CK) 1849: 9825.
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